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Jackson: Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy
FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

INTERPRETING FLORIDA'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION

The recent right of privacy amendment to the Florida Constitution' substantially alters the relationship between the state and the individual citizen.
Any constitutional amendment is significant since it alters the powers and
prerogatives of the state, but the inclusion of a fundamental right has a far
broader and deeper effect than most such changes. Moreover, the impact of the
new provision is enhanced by its unusually wide scope: the right of privacy has
been described as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
2
by civilized men."
This note suggests guidelines for judicial interpretation of Florida's new
constitutional right of privacy.3 No attempt is made to delineate either the individual conduct the right should protect or the state conduct that the right
should forbid.4 Rather, this note provides an analytical framework for judicial
interpretation of the new privacy amendment and suggests in general terms
where the new line between individual sovereignty and justifiable governmental interference should be drawn.5 First, the nature of the inquiry facing
courts and basic principles of constitutional interpretation are discussed. Anal1. FLA. CONSr. art. I, §23 provides: "Right of Privacy. - Every natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life, except as
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of
access to public records and meetings as provided by law."
The constitutional amendment creating this section was put before the Florida voters on
the November 4, 1980 election ballot, and passed by a solid 60%, majority. See Cope, A Quick
Look at Florida'sNew Right of Privacy, 55 FLA.B.J. 12 (1981).

2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. To date, the new amendment has had little treatment by the Florida courts. The only
judicial references to the new provision have been the Florida supreme court's opinion in,
Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 6 Fla. L.W. 613 (Fla. Oct. 22, 1981), see note 81 infra, Judge Anstead's
dissenting reference in State Dept. of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Zimmer, 393 So. 2d
463 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. (1981)) and Judge Hurley's concurring opinion in Proctor v. Coral Springs,
396 So. 2d 771, 773-74 (Fla. 4th D.CA. 1981). In Proctor, a Coral Springs ordinance was held
to have violated the appellant's right of association, protected in part by the new provision,
by prohibiting on- and off-street parking of pick-up trucks after 9:00 p.m. As stated by
Judge Hurley, Florida's constitutional right of privacy is "often inextricably entwined" with
the "rights of association .. . and personhood, [and its enactment was a] momentous step
[which underscored] Florida's commitment to the protection of privacy, [especially] the privacy
of the homeplace, [that] has continued unabated [since] the beginnings of our constitutional
history." Id. (Hurley, J., concurring).
4. This Note does not attempt to determine the right's protection of particular conduct,
such as consensual sexual acts between adults, or the ingestion of controlled substances, or its
prohibition of particular conduct, such as the use of advanced technological devices or undercover agents to collect evidence of crime. This responsibility belongs to the courts. See note 8
and accompanying text infra.
5. "There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy
of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially of
any free government existing under a written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of
that will." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905), quoted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 212-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). The primary function of a written constitution
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ysis of the new provision's text follows, which reveals that the amendment's
sole ambiguity lies in the crucial term "private life." The context provided by
the entire Florida Constitution, the United States Constitution, and relevant
case law is then considered for the purpose of formulating a test to determine
the conduct encompassed by the term "private life." Next, the proposed test is
evaluated to determine whether it accurately delineates the scope of this ambiguous term. Finally, the limitations that the right of privacy places on state
interference with individual liberty are evaluated.
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL INQUIRY

Demarcating the limits of the state's sovereign power over individual
6
citizens is the primary purpose of the constitution. Under our governmental
scheme," the privilege and duty of constitutional interpretation inheres in the
8
courts. Indeed, the courts' primary role, stating what the law is, reaches its
9
zenith in defining constitutionally guaranteed individual rights.

In delineating the scope of protection afforded by the privacy amendment,
5 0
courts must follow basic principles of constitutional interpretation. The first

is to define that sphere. See note 6 and accompanying text infra. The enactment of the right
of privacy thus establishes a new line between the individual and the state.
6. Getzen v. Sumter County, 89 Fla. 45, 50, 103 So. 104, 106 (1925).
7. Courts have referred to the government created by the Founding Fathers as a "limited
government" under which the power of the state to control our lives is not absolute. See
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 163-64
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Korigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 67 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Mulherin v. O'Brien, 588 F.2d 853, 855 n.9 (Ist Cir. 1978); Bishop v. Colaw, 450
F.2d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 1971); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168-69 (Alaska 1972). Commentators constantly note that our government is a "limited government" designed to secure
the blessings of liberty. See, e.g., Vieira, Rights and the United States Constitution: The
Declension from Natural Law to Legal Positivism, 13 GA. L. REV. 1447, 1453-59, 1463, 1474-75
(1979). See also Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 229
(1965); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLtJM. L. REV. 1410, 1412-16 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Privacy]; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REv. 391, 413-14 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Morals and the Constitution]; Hindes, Morality
Enforcement through the CriminalLaw and the Modern Doctrine of Substantive Due Process,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 344 (1977); Lamson, The Right to Decide -Individual Liberty Versus
State Police Powers, 18 Awiz. L. REV. 207, 217-20 (1976).
8. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-80 (1803); Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312,
314 (Fla. 1977). The "duty of the courts to maintain the constitution as the fundamental law
of the state is imperative and unceasing." Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla.
1953). See also Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 315, 31 So. 2d 483,
485 (1947). The function of the courts is to state what the law is. Jackson Lumber Co. v.
Walton County, 95 Fla. 632, 687, 116 So. 7-71, 790 (1928).
9. Since the constitution is the supreme law of the land, Jacksonville v. Continental Can
Co., 113 Fla. 168, 171, 151 So. 488, 489 (1933), and since the function of the courts is to state
what the law is, see note 8 supra. it follows that construction of the constitution is the most
important task the courts undertake. Furthermore, since the primary purpose of the constitution is to "shield minorities from majorities," Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County,
159 Fla. 311, 318, 31 So. 2d 483, 487 (1947), protection of individual rights is the highest
function of the courts.
10. Generally, these canons are the same as those applicable to statutory construction. See
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of these principles requires that the interpreting court give effect to the intent
of the people adopting the amendment." This rule reflects the democratic
ideology that sovereignty inheres in the people, not their government.1 2 Thus,
the constitution operates as a set of instructions from the people to their government.
Because the constitution must be both flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances's and permanent enough to embody timeless principles susceptible of consistent interpretation, 4 the set of instructions provided must be,
to a certain extent, general and content-neutral. 5 This point can be explicated
within the context of the constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.36 Two different types of instructions might be understood
to emanate from this provision.17 One instruction would be content-specific,
Mugge v. Warnell Lumber & Veneer Co., 58 Fla. 318, 321, 50 So. 645, 646 (1909). However,
some modification is required in certain instances. See Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co.,
113 Fla. 168, 171-72, 151 So. 488,489 (1933).
The courts speak of these canons as obligatory, asserting that they have no power to
ignore them. See St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild &Assoc., Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970).
The characterization of these canons as "firmly settled principle[s] of law," State ex rel. West

v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 1954), further supports the conclusion that to disregard them
is to commit palpable error. See generally R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIoGrs SERIOUSLY (1978).
11. St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild &Assoc., Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970). See Gallant
v. Stephens, 358 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1978); Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1978);
In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 843 So. 2d 17, 22 (Fla. 1977). See also 1 T. CoorLEY,
CONSTrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124 (8th ed. 1927).

12. "All political power is inherent in the people." FLA. CONST. art. I, §1.
13. See, e.g., Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Util. Bd., 40 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla.1949) (each
generation should possess the right to interpret our constitution); State v. Dade County, 157
Fla. 859, 862, 27 So. 2d 283, 285 (1946) ("it was not intended by [the framers of the constitution] that the dead hand of the past should shape the destiny of the future').
14. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd.of Pub. Instr., 143 So. 2d 21, 26 (Fla. 1962)
("on every question of construction [let us] carry ourselves back to the time when the constitution was adopted"); State ex rel. West v. Butler, 70 Fla. 102, 134, 69 So. 771, 780 (1915) (terms
of a constitution must be interpreted in a sense most obvious to the common understanding at
the time of its adoption). See generally Wrechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv.L. REv. 1 (1959).

15. Professor H.L.A. Hart notes that the attempt to govern the conduct of any large group
by law which can be applied by individuals themselves must use general rules. He further
notes that general rules have an "open texture" in that their application in borderline cases
will be uncertain. H. HART, THE CONCE'T OF LAw 121-24 (1961). Thus, "uncertainty at the
borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms." Id. at 125. This is
to be distinguished from the point made here, which is that the need for flexibility in the
meaning of constitutional provisions entails that the provisions be content-neutral.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII; FLA. CONST. art. I, §17.
17. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 134-36. Professor Dworkin introduces the argument by considering his hypothetical instructions to his children to be fair: "I no doubt have
in mind examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would not accept that my
'meaning' was limited to these examples, for two reasons. First, I would expect my children to
apply my instructions to situations I had not and could not have thought about. Second, I
stand ready to admit that some particular act I had thought was fair when I spoke was in
fact unfair, or vice versa, if one of my children is able to convince me of that later, in that
case I should want to say that my instructions covered the case he cited, not that I had
changed my instructions. I might say that I meant the family to be guided by the concept of
fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness I might have had in mind." Id. at 134.
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directing the courts to prohibit what the adopting public deemed to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. Under this type of instruction courts would be
bound by the content of the idea as understood by the adopters, and would be
prohibited from responding to changing ideas of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. The other instruction would be content-neutral, requiring the courts to prohibit conduct that in light of changing circumstances is
deemed to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Under this type of instruction the specific content of the idea is not meant to be fixed by the original
adopters. Rather, their intent is to bind courts to the general standard that
cruel and unusual punishment is to be prohibited. This approach avoids the
crippling rigidity of the content-specific instruction and accommodates the
reality that the public's conception of cruel and unusual punishment changes
over time.18
An important corollary to the foregoing analysis is that individual opinions
as to what the new provision specifically protects and prohibits are generally
not an important source of its meaning. 19 Rather, the courts are to utilize the
text of the provision to determine the details of its meaning.20 An exception
exists, however, where the individual opinions coalesce to form a collective
intent as to the meaning of the provision,21 or where something similar to an

Dworkin's distinction here between "concepts" and "conceptions" is the basis for distinguishing the two types of instructions: "[tlhe difference is a difference not just in the detail
of the instructions given but in the kind of instructions given. When I appeal to the concept
of fairness I appeal to what fairness means, and I give my own views on that issue no special
standing. When I lay down a conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by fairness, and
my view is therefore the heart of the matter." Id. at 135.
Dworkin concludes that constitutional provisions such as those prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment embody content-neutral concepts rather than content-specific conceptions,
reasoning that "[ilf those who enacted the broad clauses had meant to lay down particular
conceptions, they would have found the sort of language conventionally used to do this, that
is, they would have offered particular theories of the concepts in question." Id. at 136.
18. It is suggested that the latter kind of instruction is generally intended in constitutional
provisions. Thus, for example, in determining whether capital punishment constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment, "[i]t would be a mistake for the Court to be much influenced by the
fact that when the clause was adopted capital punishment was standard and unquestioned.
That would be decisive if the framers of the clause had meant to lay down a particular conception of cruelty, because it would show that the conception did not extend so far. But it is
not decisive of the different question the Court . . . faces, which is this: Can the Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the concept of cruelty, now defend a conception that does
not make death cruel?" Id. at 135-116.
19. Generally speaking, since the intent behind constitutional provisions is not to bind
the courts to a particular conception held by the people, but rather to a general standard to
provide for flexibility, opinions which set forth the details of a provision's effect misconceive
the kind of instruction the provision gives to the courts. See notes 13-18 and accompanying
text, supra.
20. See Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, THE NEw YoRK REvEw OF BooKs,
Dec. 22, 1979, at 37. See also note; 24-27 and accompanying text, infra.
21. Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 567, 570 (1978). "The intent of the framers is a useful aid in the interpretation of constitutional provisions that are not clear on their face, but only if the collective intent can
be established ....
The record may not contain enough evidence to lead to any conclusion at
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election brochure carries dispositive weight by convention. 2 Such a situation is
not present with the privacy amendment. Even cursory examination of the legislative history and public debate surrounding23 the new provision establishes
that no collective intent exists as to its meaning.
THE SOURCES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION'S MEANING

Well entrenched canons of constitutional interpretation establish a hierarchy of sources which courts can exainine to determine the meaning of a provision. The text of a provision must be consulted first. Only where ambiguity
exists or the plain meaning of the words leads to an unreasonable conclusion
are the courts permitted to look beyond the text.24 The familiar doctrine of
construction in para materiamandates that the first source to be consulted out25
side the text of the amendment is the remainder of the state constitution.2 6
Interpretations that do not harmonize the entire instrument can be rejected.
If ambiguity is thereby eliminated, resort to non-constitutional sources is unnecessary. 27
all; or the record may contain such confficting evidence that no collective intent emerges." Id.

(emphasis in original). See generally Dworkin, supra note 20.
22. This was the case with California's state constitutional privacy amendment. CAL.
CONsT. art. I, §1 (as amended Nov. 1974). See Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 848, 610
P.2d 436 (1980); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222 (1975). Dworkin suggests that
a congressional bill's preamble and committee report have analogous weight by virtue of
convention. Dworkin, supranote 20.
23. Indeed, one of the principal objections raised against the privacy amendment was
that it would permit the courts wide discretion as to its meaning. See Cope, supra note 1, at
12. But see Mills, Proposing Adding Privacy to the Bill of Rights, PUBLIC ADMIN. CLEARING
SERV., U. FLA., CIVIC INFORMATION SERES No. 63, 16-18 (1980).

24. "If the language is clear and not entirely unreasonable or illogical in its operation
[the courts] have no power to go outside the bounds of the constitutional provision in search
of excuses to give a different meaning to words used therein." St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild
& Assoc., Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970). See generally I T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 141.
25. See Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1976); In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 313 So. 2d 697, 701 (Fla. 1975); Burnsed v. Seaboard Coast Line, 290 So. 2d 13, 16
(Fla. 1974). See also 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 127-28. It should be noted that the doctrine of construction in para materia as applied to statutes has a different meaning than when
applied to constitutional provisions. Harmonizing statutes with the constitution attempts to
save them from unconstitutionality. Harmonizing a provision of the constitution with the
entire document attempts to give every word some meaning. See note 26 infra.
26. "In construing the Constitution every section should be considered so that the Constitution will be given effect as a harmonious whole. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the Constitution should be rejected." Askew v. Game & Fresh Water
Fish Comm'n, 336 So. 2d 556, 560 (Fla. 1978). "This Court has consistently held that the Constitution shall be construed in such a manner as to give effect to every clause and every part
thereof." In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 313 So. 2d 697, 701 (Fla. 1975). See Burnsed v.
Seaboard Coast Line, 290 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1974); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 848 (Fla.
1961); Miami Shores Village v. Cowart, 108 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1958); Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, 96 So. 2d 541, 545 (Fla. 1957). See generally 1 T. CooLEY, supra note 11, at
128-29.
27. This follows from the doctrine of construction in para materia and the principle
enunciated in St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Assoc., Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970), that
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Although the doctrine of construction in para materia does not require consideration of the United States Constitution in construing a provision of the
state constitution,28 its underlying rationale seems to support such an extension.
The reason for consulting the entire state constitution when construing any of
its provisions is to ensure that the entire set of public instructions, and indeed
every word, is given effect.2 9 Because additional instructions are found in the
Federal Constitution, both documents should be consulted to determine the
meaning of a state constitutional provision s 0 Interpretations which harmonize s ' all of the language found in both the state and the Federal constitutions
should be favored.
If consideration of the text and constitutional context of a provision fails to
clarify its meaning, non-constitutional sources may be used to ascertain the
intent of the adopters. 2 Legislative history and public debate are the primary
non-textual sources of this intent; they establish the concerns that lead to the
provision's adoption. 3 However, where a provision is clear on its face or can be
34
made clear by its constitutional context, courts may not consider these sources.
when a provision is unambiguous and clear within the context of the constitution as a whole,
the courts "have no power to go outside the bounds of the constitution[ ]." Id. See notes 24-26
and accompanying text, supra.
28. When construing a constitutional provision, the doctrine of construction in para
materia requires that the entire document be examined so as to give effect to every word. See
notes 25-26 supra. Although lower courts often rely on the Supreme Court's construction of
the United States Constitution to guide their interpretation of similar state constitutional
provisions, they are not bound to do so. See, e.g., Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n. v.
Milk Control Bd., 124 Fla. 797, 805, 169 So. 541, 544 (1936). The extension suggested here
would require courts to consider both the Federal Constitution and the state constitution
when construing a state constitutional provision and to reject interpretations which fail to
give effect to every word of the state constitution. See note 31 infra.
29. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text, supra.
30. Otherwise, a state provision might be subsumed or overridden by the Federal Constitution, rendering it ineffective. It has been established beyond peradventure that states
may exceed the protection established by the United States Constitution. See PruneYard
Shopping Center Corp. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 513
(Alaska 1975) (Boochever, J., concurring); Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control
Bd., 124 Fla. 797, 806, 169 So. 541, 544 (1936). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 735 n.18
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L.
REv. 454; Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62
VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Note, Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REV. 271 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Project Report]; Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as CaliforniaDeclaration of Rights]; Comment, The Montana Constitution:
Taking New Rights Seriously, 39 MONT. L. REv. 221 (1978).
31. It is essential to recognize that harmony between a state constitutional provision and
federally guaranteed rights is not established by construing the provision to protect exactly
what the federal right protects: rather, this makes the provision superfluous. See notes 141-144
and accompanying text, infra.
32. See generally Levinson, supra note 21.
33. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d 130, 135 (Fla. 1969). See
also 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 141-42.
34. See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
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These basic principles of constitutional interpretation prescribe the course to

be followed by the courts and by this note. Keeping in focus the general nature
of the present inquiry,S the first step in interpreting Florida's new right of
privacy involves analysis of the text of the amendment. Any ambiguity remaining after this textual analysis must be resolved by the context provided by
the Florida and Federal constitutions. If contextual analysis fails to clarify
the ambiguity, the legislative history and public debate must then be considered.s
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The text of the new privacy provision reads: "Every natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life,
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to
limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by
law. ' 37 The constitution's index and the ballot provision labeled the section
the "Right of Privacy."38 Thus, while the phrase right of privacy is not contained in the text of the new provision, it seems relevant in determining the
intent of the adopters. One commentator has suggested that the omission of
"Right of Privacy" from the text has no significance because "the right to be
let alone" is used interchangeably with that phrase.3 9 Another commentator has
noted, however, that the tones of the two expressions differ: privacy "suggests
what has been withdrawn from public view... [i]t suggests secrecy and darkness," 40 whereas the right to be let alone encompasses public conduct, for "[flits
essence is the claim that there is a sphere... that has not been dedicated to
public use or control." 4'3 To the extent the expressions are substantively different, the textual presence of the right to be let alone mandates that it, and not
42
the right of privacy, control the meaning of the new provision.
This preliminary matter aside, consideration of two complementary lirinciples of textual analysis is worthwhile before delving into the substance of the
new provision. The first principle is that words should be interpreted in their
normal sense and given their ordinary meaning.43 The second principle is that
terms of art should be interpreted and understood in their technical sense."
85. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text, supra.
86. This Note does not engage in analysis of the legislative history and public debate; it
is submitted that textual and contextual analysis are sufficient to establish the meaning of the
new provision.
37. FLA. CONST. art. I §23.
38. Id. See Official Ballot, Florida General Election (Nov. 4, 1980).
39. Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida'sProposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav.
671, 741 &n.408 (1978).
40. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A PhilosophicalPrelude, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
272,279 (1966).
41. Id. at 279-80.
42. See FLA. CONsr. art. X, §12(h).
43. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, Request of June 29, 1979, 374 So. 2d
959, 964 (Fla. 1979); Johnson v. McDonald, 269 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1972); Wilson v. Crews,
160 Fla. 169, 175, 34 So. 2d 114, 118 (1948); 1 T. CoolEY, supra note 11, at 130-32. But see id.
at 132-33.
44. See I T. CooLEY, supra note 11, at 132-33.
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Although seemingly inconsistent, the underlying goal that the intent of the
people be given effect 45 renders these rules of interpretation complementary.
Ordinary words are generally understood in their ordinary sense and terms of
art are generally understood in their special sense. 46 The two principles thus
combine to give effect to words in the sense they are usually understood by the
public, and thereby serve the fundamental goal of effectuating the intent of the
people.
The text of the new provision can best be analyzed by considering groups
of words separately. In the format that follows, portions of the text of the
amendment are italicized and their meaning is then discussed.
Every NaturalPerson
The opening words of the new provision limit the right's protection to real
people.47 Thus, even children, incompetents, and non-citizens are included
within the provision.48 Conversely, corporations are clearly excluded. 49 One
commentator has suggested that limiting protection to individuals excludes
economic activity from the ambit of the amendment. 50 As a per se rule, however, this conclusion appears to be incorrect. Because corporations cannot claim
protection under this section does not mean that individuals engaged in economic activity with corporations are similarly barred. If a natural person can
prove that state regulation of a corporation impinged on his individual right
of privacy, a prima facie claim against the regulation will be established. 51
Has the Right to Be Let Alone
This portion of the provision contains two distinct concepts. The first concept concerns what is meant by possession of a right. The second concept pertains to the specific content of the right to be let alone.
Classic Hohfeldian analysis5 2 states that the possession of a right places a
corresponding duty of non-interference with that right on the person(s) against
45. See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
46. With terms of art, "the meaning of the phrase [has] become defined in the history of
constitutional law, and [is] so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it. The technical sense in these cases is the
sense popularly understood." I T. Coor.y, supra note 11, at 132. Thus, both rules attempt to
give words their customary meaning.
47. This is in contrast to organizations which are deemed "persons" by operation of law.
See note 49 and accompanying text, infra.
48. This logically follows from the new provision's stated guarantee to every natural
person. On the other hand, a human fetus would not be protected. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 158 (1973).
49. Corporations are fictitious "persons" by virtue of the law. They are excluded by the
term "natural" from the protection of the new provision. See Cope, supra note 39, at 741-42.
50. See Cope, supra note 39, at '742.
51. This is not to say that under such circumstances the regulation would not be
sustained. Rather, the state would then have the heavy burden of proving that the regulation
was necessary to further an important state interest. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text,
infra.
52. Professor Hohfeld's article on legal relationships has attained the status of a classic.
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whom the right is held. 5 Therefore, when a right is held against a government,
that government has a duty not to abridge that right0 4 The governmental duty
of non-interference is not absolute, however. It can be overridden to the extent
necessary to achieve an important governmental interest.- s Only unduly broad
infringements of the right are prohibited: the government must adopt the
"least intrusive means" of furthering its interest.56 Conversely, where there is
no right, there is no duty of non-interference. In such circumstances the government can act to further any legitimate governmental interest, and necessity
need not be demonstrated. Thus, possession of a right against the government
imposes two important restrictions on governmental acts: first, the act must
further an important or compelling interest rather than merely a legitimate
one, and second, the act must be necessary to achieve that interest.5 8
Whether understood as ordinary language or as a term of art, the right to be
let alone encompasses a broad range of interests. As ordinary language the
His analysis identifies two sets of four terms which, he argued, identify all legal relationships.
The terms are paired as "jural opposites" and "jural correlatives" as follows:
Jural

right

privilege

power

immunity

Opposites

no-right

duty

disability

liability

Jural
Correlatives

right
duty

privilege
no-right

power
liability

immunity
disability

Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YAME
LJ. 16, 30 (1913). Jural opposites are contrary legal relations; for example, possessing a

privilege is the opposite of being under a duty. Jural correlatives are present in any legal
relation as two sides are part of the same coin: for example, possession of a right against
someone means the other is under a duty to the holder of the right. In Hohfeld's words, "if
X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent)
is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place." Id. at 32.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See note 52 supra.
See R. DwopauN, supra note 10, at 22.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973).
Id. at 155-56, 216-18.

57. "State legislation... may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds
it unnecessary." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). Rather, a "law need not be in every
respect logically consistent with its alms to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it." Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
58. The difference created by the existence of a fundamental right is essentially one of
closer scrutiny regarding the legislation's furtherance of permissible public goals. Where no
right is impinged, it is enough if the legislative measure "might be thought" to correct an
acknowledged evil. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). In
contrast, where a protected right is infringed, the state may not prevail "simply on a showing
that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state
purpose." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Thus
in its analysis the Court has acknowledged "what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must,
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 583 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal of appeal), quoted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (Stuart, J., concurring).
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words suggest freedom from both the presence and interference of others.19
The first is subsumed within the second, however, since demands, requests, and
even mere presence can constitute interference by others.60
As a term of art, the right to be let alone originally meant freedom from
undesired bodily contact or from interference with bodily integrity. 61 Its modern connotation, however, developed from the expanded meaning given to the
term by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their seminal article on the
right of privacy.62 Concerned with protection of the solitude and privacy that
"the intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered ... more essential to the individual,"6 3 they suggested that one
should be able to control disclosure of personal information. They also argued
that a sound basis for prohibiting unwanted publication of private facts could
be found in "the right to one's personality,"6 4 and the "right to enjoy life, the right to be let alone."65 Recent judicial opinions have expanded the meaning of the right to be let alone beyond that comprehended by Warren and
Brandeis to include freedom from regulation of one's personal life. 66 Therefore,
the current understanding of right to be let alone places it at the core of the
concept of liberty, protecting the citizen's freedom from governmental control.6T
Although in scope the right connotes "total personal immunity from governmental control,"6s the freedom to do what one pleases is limited by the protected interests of other members of society.6 9 Courts have attempted to strike
a balance between the individual's right to be let alone and government's
power to regulate conduct by weighing the importance and intimacy of the
individual's decision to engage in the desired conduct70 against the public in59. People say "leave me alone" both when they desire solitude and when they object to
the interference of another in their activities.
60. Interference prevents or makes more difficult the attainment of desires. Such desires
may include solitude. Therefore, interference may be caused by mere presence. Similarly, the
desire not to be answerable to another may be interfered with by requests or demands for
information, and the desire to undergo certain experiences may be interfered with by demands
to the contrary, such as those imposed by law.
61. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (quoting T. CooLEY, TORTS
29 (2d ed. 1888)).
62. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
63. Id. at 196.
64. Id. at 207.
65. Id. at 193.
66. "[T]he right 'to be let alone' . . . includes the privilege of an individual to plan his
own affairs, for, 'outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape
his own life as he thinks best.'" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972) (school hair length regulation);
State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969) (mandatory motorcycle helmet law); State v. Kantner,
493 P.2d 306 (Hawaii 1972) (possession of marijuana).
67. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (Alaska 1975); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159,
168 (Alaska 1972).
68. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (Alaska 1975) (quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d
159, 168 (Alaska 1972)).
69. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500-04, 508-09 (Alaska 1975); State ex reL.
Zander v. District Court, 594 P.2d 273, 292-95 (Mont. 1979) (Shea, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., State v. Kantner, 493 P.2d 306, 315 (Hawaii 1972) (Levinson, J., dissenting).
See notes 156-157 and accompanying text, infra.
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terest served by the regulation.- The right has been given special emphasis in
the home72 due to the attenuated public concern and the intense intimacy of
that context. Though first articulated over a half century ago, the characterization of the right to be let alone as "the most comprehensive of rights"3 remains
accurate today.
And Free from Governmental Intrusion
Three words in this phrase require special examination: "and", "governmental", and "intrusion." The conjunction "and" requires attention because in
the substantive and grammatical context of the rest of the sentence its usual
meaning creates ambiguity.74 The words "governmental" and "intrusion" act
as words of limitation. Interpreting "governmental" involves no real difficulty. 6
The word "intrusion," however, persents a more difficult problem due to the
widely ranging results obtained by different interpretations of the term."
A persuasive argument has been made that as used in the new provision,
"and" does not mean "as well as" but rather operates in conjunction with the
words that follow to limit the preceding broad right.77 Two reasons support
this construction. First, the text speaks of a single right, not a group of rights.
If "and" were given its normal meaning a duplicity of rights would be created:
the right to be let alone and the right to be free from governmental intrusion
into one's private life. Second, this reading of "and" would render the succeeding words surplusage. If the right to be let alone were not limited by the subsequent words, protection would be extended beyond freedom from governmental intrusion into one's private life.78 Thus, the latter freedom would be
protected by the former even without expression. Conversely, "the right to be
let alone" is not rendered meaningless by the limitation imposed by the succeeding text. Rather, it retains vitality by suggesting the tone for appropriate
interpretations of the limiting words which follow. 9
The general import of the term "governmental" is relatively clear, given the
foregoing conclusion that it operates to limit the protection of the right to be
let alone. It establishes that the new provision curtails only state, and not
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500-04, 508-09 (Alaska 1975).
See, e.g., id.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See notes 77-79 and accompanying text, infra.
See notes 80-81 and accompanying text, infra.
See notes 82-103 and accompanying text, infra.
See Cope, supra note 39, at 742 nA13.
Since the right to be let alone comprehends complete freedom from governmental

control, without the limitation on the right imposed by "private life," the new provision's
scope would include every regulation of liberty by the state. See note 68 and accompanying
text, supra. Thus, the interpretation of "and" to mean "as well as" renders the succeeding
words superfluous.
79. The courts must consider the difference between the new provision and a provision
which guaranteed only "the right to be free from governmental interference into one's private
life." There must be some meaning to "the right to be let alone," see note 26 supra, therefore,
it is submitted that its inclusion can only be given effect by construing the rest of the new
provision in light of its current meaning.
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private, interference with one's right to be let alone.8 0 Nevertheless, despite the
clarity of the general standard implied by the term "governmental", much
litigation can be expected concerning what situations fit within that standard.8 1
The word "intrusion" arguably excludes certain types of governmental acts
from the scope of the new provision. Both the dictionary definition8 2 and fourth
amendment case law8 3 suggest that the term contemplates the type of forcible
entry that occurs in a police search. The legislative history of the provision reveals that many proponents' primary concern was the threat to privacy created
by the government's increasing ability to gather information through modern
technological devices. 4 These sources could lead courts to hold that "intrusion"
relates only to information gathering and that therefore the new provision does
not limit legislative regulation of conduct.8 5
There are two telling objections to the foregoing interpretation. First, intrusion has a broader meaning which includes regulation of conduct by law.86
Second, even if intrusion only means information-gathering, the new provision
8s
may still affect legislative regulation of conduct
While the paradigmatic example of an intrusion may be a search by the
police, only someone with an unjustifiably narrow focus can contend that such
an example exhausts the meaning of the term.8 8 The United States Supreme
Court has certainly not limited the concept of impermissible intrusions to
police searches. Instead, the Court has also found laws to be overly intrusive,
particularly in the context of the right of privacy protected by the United

80. See Cope, supra note 39, at 742.
81. The Supreme Court of Florida's only reference to the new provision to date concerns
its applicability to private attorneys, who "carry some hue of governmental color ... as officers
of the court." Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 6 Fla. L.W. 613, 615 n.6 (Fla. Oct. 22, 1981). Whether
certain organizations are "governmental" has been fiercely disputed in context of Florida's
"Sunshine Laws." See, e.g., Campus Communications, Inc. v. Marston, No. 88-25 (Fla. 8th Cir.
Ct., July 24, 1981) (whether state university dean search is "public meeting").
82. THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 443 (1970) defines "intrusion" as: "something
thrust in, a forcible or unwelcome addition. . . . The act of thrusting oneself in an encroaching manner, or of introducing something inappropriately; uninvited or unwelcome
entrance or appearance; encroachment on something possessed or enjoyed by another." To
"intrude" is to "thrust, force, or drive (anything) in; to introduce by force." Id. at 442.
83. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438
(1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
84. See Cope, supra note 39, at 721-22. Although Cope's article discusses the concerns of
the 1978 Constitutional Revision Commission rather than those of the 1980 legislature, since
the legislature adopted the exact text of the Commission's proposal, it is reasonable to assume
that the concerns were the same. Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, §23 with Fla. C.R.C., REv. FLA.
CONST. art I, §23 (May 11, 1978), quoted in Cope, supra note 39, at 675.
85. Jon Mills, one of the sponsors of the right of privacy in the Legislature, has stated
that the new provision does not prohibit legislative regulation of marijuana in the home, for
example. Conversations with State Representative Jon Mills (Jan.-Mar., 1981).
86. See notes 88-93 and accompanying text, infra.
87. See notes 94-103 and accompanying text, infra.
88. Indeed, one must ignore nearly every case construing the federally-guaranteed right
of privacy outside of the fourth amendment, as well as the use of the term by the general
public.
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States Constitution.s 9 Indeed, the birth of the federal constitutional right of
privacy depended upon the recognition that the home is not only safeguarded
from unreasonable searches but also "against all unreasonable intrusions of
whatever character." 90 This includes "the form of intrusion [created by] the
enactment of a substantive offense.""' Furthermore, most commentators speak
of regulation of conduct by law as an intrusion on personal liberty,92 and
legislators also use the term in this sense.93
If, contrary to the usual practice of the courts and the public, the meaning
of intrusion is limited to information-gathering activities, regulatory laws may
still fall within the protective scope of he new provision. Indeed, several
Supreme Court decisions have struck down laws as an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy because of the intrusion (in the narrow sense)
that enforcement would entail. In Griswold v. Connecticut,-4 which first established the existence of the federal constitutional right of privacy, the court
indicates that the decision was partially based on the impermissibly intrusive
means that would have been required to enforce Connecticut's anti-contraceptive law: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."95
Similarly, the widely-noted decision by the Alaska supreme court in Ravin v.
State9- relied explicitly upon the intrusiveness rationale. In Ravin, the court
held that constitutional protection extended to possession of marijuana in the
home by adults for personal use.97 The decision was not based on a right to
ingest marijuana. In fact, the court explicitly rejected the contention that such
a right existed.99 Rather, the holding turned on the necessity of intrusion (in
the narrow sense) into the home to enforce the law proscribing possession of
89. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baira, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
90. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal of

appeal).
91.

Id. at 551.

92. See, e.g., Bender, Privacies of Life, in 1 POLITICAL

AND CIVI R GHrs iN TnE UNrri
STATEs 816 (N. Dorsen, P. Bender & B. Neuborne, eds. 4th ed. 1976); Emerson, supra note 7,
at 229. But see Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fairand Effective
Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come A Long Way, Baby, 23 KA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1974).
Professor Henkin distinguishes intrusion from regulation, yet speaks of autonomy as freedom
from "intrusion by law." Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUm. L. REv. 1410, 1424-25
(1974). Similarly ambiguous is Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Individual
Lifestyles, 62 CORNEL L. REv. 563, 588-90 (1977).
93. "We are just sick of governmental intrusion in our daily lives." State Senator Dan
Jenkins (referring to the Florida law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets) quoted in

Gainesville Sun, Apr. 30, 1981, §B, at 5, col. 5.
94. 381 US. 479 (1965).
95. Id. at 485.
96. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). See generally Comment, Marijuana Prohibitionand the
ConstitutionalRight of Privacy: An Examination of Ravin v. State, 11 TULSA L.J. 563 (1976);
Comment, Right to Privacy Protects Personal Use of Marijuana in the Home, 15 WAsIMUMN
LJ.491 (1976).
97. 537P.2dat5ll.
98. Id. at 502.
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marijuana 9 The court felt that the privacy status of the home mandated that
intrusions in that context be supported by a close and substantial relationship
to the public welfare.100 Because enforcement of the marijuana possession law
did not satisfy this imperative,11 the court held that it could not be enforced
in the home.

10 2

Griswold and Ravin demonstrate that some regulation of conduct by law
may be prohibited by the new privacy provision even if the meaning of intrusion is limited to information gathering. It is herein submitted that the
better view is that intrusion encompasses a variety of governmental acts, including legislative regulation of conduct. To the extent this view is rejected,
however, indirect restrictions on the legislative power to control certain aspects
of one's life can result from the intrusion required to enforce any law.103
Into His PrivateLife
As previously indicated,' 4 the term "private life" limits the reach of the
new provision. Although the general meaning of the other terms of the privacy
amendment are relatively clear, the same cannot be said of "private life." The
difficulty does not lie in determining whether certain facts fall within a general
standard, as with the term governmental,1° but rather in determining the gen10 6
eral standard that "private life" comprehends.
0

Several alternatives exist. The first meaning of "private life"107 was non-

official life: "the round of activities of one who does not hold public office."1o8
Warren and Brandeis employed the public official/private citizen dichotomylo 9
but their understanding of "private life" was closer to the secret or unexposed
aspects of one's life than to non-official conduct. Under their view, one's private
life consists of matters which are legitimately kept from public view.11O What
is knowingly exposed,"' and what is properly of public interest, "1 2 is not part
99. Id. at 511.

100. Id. at 503-04.
101. Id.at5ll.
102. Id.
103. Of course, no law can be enforced absent proof of its violation. Justice Harlan noted
that even if the means of acquiring that proof did not invade protected privacy interests, exposure in open court certainly would. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548-49 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). See also Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?,26 STAN. L. REV.

1161, 1163-64 (1974).
104. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text, supra.
105. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text, supra.
106. In the terminology used earlier, the problem is not merely determining the application of an instruction to a set of facts, but rather the more profound difficulty of determining
just what the instruction is. In Professor Dworkin's terms, the question is what concept is
embodied in the term "private life." See notes 17-18 and accompanying text, supra.
107. Etymologically, "private" comes from the Latin privatus, meaning "apart from the
state." WFBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1969 (2d ed. Unabr. 1950).
108. Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 281, 283

(1966).
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Warren 9-Brandeis, supranote 62, at 215-16.
See id. at 214-15.
Seeid. at218.
See id. at 214-15.
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of one's private life. Another alternative approach derives the concept of
"private life" from the current meaning of the right to be let alone. 113 According
to this theory, one's private life consists of those aspects which as a matter of
principle" 4 should not be subject to governmental control. Whether something
is exposed to the public is relevant but not dispositive to the determination of
its inclusion in one's private life."15 Rather, the controlling question is whether
governmental interference can be adequately justified by the alleviation of some
genuine public harm" 6 in light of the importance to the individual of the
regulated matter." 7
Each of these interpretations of "private life" embodies an ordinary meaning of the term," s and can be supported on that basis. Although the final
alternative best reflects the tone of the provision, this seems too insignificant
and subjective a reason to adopt it. Since none of the interpretations create
inconsistency with the rest of the new provision 119 the ambiguity must be re20
solved by other sources.
Except as OtherwiseProvidedHerein
When found in the state constitution, "herein" refers to the entire text of
the document."' Therefore, this portion of the new provision establishes that
113. See notes 66-73 and accompanying text, supra.
114. The underlying principle to be used in this definition or standard is a normative
principle which identifies the appropriate role of government, or in other words, the principle
which determines the appropriate placement of the line separating the sphere of governmental authority from the sphere of individual autonomy. See note 5 supra. In a free society
such as ours, the content of this principle must be determined by the views of the people. See
FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, §1 which states: "All political power is inherent in the people."
115. It would be dispositive if the underlying principle establishing the proper sphere of
governmental authority placed everything exposed to others within that sphere, but the
guarantee of freedom of speech proves that this is not the case. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I; FLA.
CoNsT. art. I, §4.

116. That some genuine public harm, however defined, must be alleviated in order to
justify governmental interference follows from the supposition that "Governments are instituted among Men" in order to "secure the Blessings of Liberty." See Declaration of Independence; U.S. CONST. Preamble. This also comports with the analysis employed in the
cases involving the right to be let alone. See note 71 and accompanying text, supra.
117. It seems reasonable to judge governmental interference with liberty on the basis of
its significance and to xequire greater justification for more significant infringements. Thus,
the adequacy of the justification will reflect the importance of the matter regulated to the
individual. This also comports with the analysis used in the cases involving the right to be
let alone. See note 70 and accompanying text, supra.
118. "Private" has several ordinary meanings, including non-official, secret, and personal.
See WEmsr's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,

supra note 107, at 1969.

119. This is largely due to the importance of the term "private life" in determining the
scope and meaning of the new provision. This term carries the full weight of the new provision's meaning except for the limitation imposed by the word "governmental" on the right
to be let alone and the exceptions which follow the term "private life." See notes 121-131 and
accompanying text, infra. Thus, inconsistency is nearly impossible.
120. The primary source is the constitutional context of the provision; if this alone fails
to clarify the term, the legislative history and public debate will then be considered. See note
24 and accompanying text, supra.
121.

See FLA. CONs. art. X, §12(a).
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other constitutional provisions are not affected by the privacy amendment, since
the latter must give way to the extent of any conflict. 1 22 Two other sections of

the state constitution are notable in this regard. The first is the search and
seizure provision123 permitting the issuance of warrants based on probable
cause. The second is the "Sunshine Amendment"'124 requiring disclosure of
certain financial matters by those holding or seeking public office.
This Section Shall Not Be Construed to Limit the
Public'sRight of Access to Public Records
and Meetings as Provided by Law
The second sentence of the new provision refers to Florida's Public Records
Act 25 and to the public meeting provision of the Public Business Title of the

Florida Statutes. 12 These statutory provisions prohibit the government from
operating in secret, and guarantee public access to documents promulgated by
agencies of the state. 127 Furthermore, these provisions ensure open government
and are designed to facilitate governmental responsiveness to the will of the
people. 28 Although legislative revision of these "Sunshine Laws" remains possible, 1 9 the courts are precluded from invalidating or creating exceptions to
these laws on the basis of the new provision.1 0 The legislature cannot erode
the right of privacy, however, by amending the laws of the state. Although the
new provision cannot be utilized to interfere with access to public records and
meetings, it may protect their content. A law infringing the right of privacy by
requiring individuals testifying before legislative committees to reveal their
sexual fantasies, for example, would violate the new provision."'s
The foregoing textual analysis does much to define Florida's constitutional
right of privacy. Further clarification of the term private life is required, however, to establish fully the new provision's meaning."'s The remainder of this
note attempts to provide that clarification.

122. See Cope, supra note 1, at 12. But see Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 609, 655-56 (1978) (suggesting new provision might "tip the balance" in close
search-and-seizure cases).
123. FLA. CONsT. art. I, §12.
124. Id. art. II, §8.
125, FLA. STAT. §119 (1979).
126. Id. §286.011 (1979).
127. See id.
128. The theory is that government "in the Sunshine," subject to inspection by the public,
is unable to avoid accountability to the public.
129. Since the provision states "as provided by law" it does not prevent revision of the law.
130. That this is the meaning of "shall not be construed" is clear. See Cope, supra note 1,
at 12-13.
131. Nothing would prevent the courts from vindicating the individual's right to refuse
to so testify. Rather, the courts would only be precluded from safeguarding the individual's
right by restricting public access.
132, That is to establish the general import, rather than the particular effects of the new
provision.
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Examination of the constitutional context of the new provision is helpful
in developing the meaning of private life only if the state constitution is supplemented with the Federal Constitution. 1 3 The context provided by the Florida
Constitution alone fails to clarify the term for two reasons. First, the new provision yields to the other portions of the Florida Constitution to the extent of
conflict. 34 This limitation allows any interpretation to harmonize the entire
document provided it gives the new provision some effect. 3 5 As all three suggested interpretations of private life satisfy this criterion, none can be rejected
for conflicting with the rest of the state constitution. Second, the term private
life does not appear elsewhere in the constitution. The term private communications appears in article I section 12.13 6 In that provision, private has been
interpreted to mean "not exposed to the public." It does not follow, however,
that private has the same meaning in all contexts. 3 7 To assert that private must
have the same meaning throughout the constitutional text would violate established principles of textual interpretation.38 Thus, the text of the state constitution does not clarify the meaning of private life. 39
In contrast, harmonizing Florida's right of privacy with the United States
Constitution's right of privacy' 49 reduces the number of reasonable interpretations of private life. Harmony between the state and federal rights of privacy,
however, is not created by giving them the same meaning. 14 ' Construing the
133. See notes 25-31 and accompanying text, supra.
134. See notes 121-122 and accompanying text, supra.
135. This is so because the doctrine of construction in para materia, as applied to constitutions rather than to statutes, merely requires that each word be given some effect. See
notes 25-27 and accompanying text, supra.
136. FLA. CONsT. art. I, §12 provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the
unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No
warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized,
the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of the evidence to be obtained. Articles
or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence."
137. As a general rule, it is reasonable to suppose that words may have different meanings
in different contexts. Since the term "private" is subject to many ordinary meanings, the
reasonableness of permitting diverse meanings is enhanced. See note 118 and accompanying
text, supra.
138. Words should be given their ordinary meaning in the context used. See notes 41-46
and accompanying text, supra. The restriction of words to a single meaning in all contexts
violates this canon and results in unacceptable interpretations. Compare FLA. CoNsr. art. I,
§§10, 11 ("special law' with FLA. CONST. art. VI, §5 ("special elections').
139. There is no clarification in the sense of justifying a particular interpretation of
"private life." If, as suggested, "private life" consists of matters properly beyond the government's control, the text of the state constitution is helpful in giving content to the concept of
"private life."
140. The United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right of privacy, but
protection of this right as an aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
has been explicitly recognized since the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). See notes 147-166 and accompanying text, infra.
141. "Even when [state] Constitutional provisions are closely akin to those of the Fed-
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state right to protect only what the federal right already protects would render
the new provision superfluous. 14 2 Furthermore, construing the state right to
protect less than its federal counterpart is equally contrary to reason. 43 The
desired harmony can only be achieved by construing Florida's constitutional
44
right of privacy as related to, but broader than, the federal right.1
The foregoing analysis suggests that federal cases defining the right of
privacy will be of assistance in determining the minimum scope of Florida's
constitutional right of privacy. 14 Because writing on the federal right of privacy
is voluminous, 46 the following discussion identifies only the broad contours of
the right. Such an approach is sufficient to determine which of the suggested
interpretations best harmonizes the new provision with its federal counterpart.
Griswold v. Connecticut147 gave birth to the federal right of privacy. The
majority emphasized that enforcement of a state statute prohibiting contraceptive use by married couples would unconstitutionally intrude upon the ineral Constitution, . . . [while] we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed
upon us by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our [state] Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be
within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional language and to be necessary for
the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage.
We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitutional direction from the highest
court of the land. Instead, we should be moving concurrently to develop and expand the
principles embedded in our constitutional law.'" Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 513 (Alaska
1975) (Boochever, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
142. Perhaps this is too strong a statement: if the new provision is construed to protect
the same interests as the federal right, its adoption safeguards privacy against future erosion
of the federal right by the United States Supreme Court. The lack of textual support in the
Federal Constitution for the right of privacy increases the possibility of erosion, consequently,
this construction of the new provision is less absurd than it first appears. On the other hand,
this argument needs further support to rise past the level of bare respectability to plausibility.
143. Were the federal right of privacy explicitly stated in the text of the Constitution
this would not be the case, but since it is not, Florida's express provision should be construed
to protect more than the federal right, not less. This conclusion is easily reached once it is
recognized that the state constitution, like the Federal Constitution, contains an implicit right
of privacy. This is so because the sources of the implicit federal right have counterparts in the
state constitution. Compare U.S. CONsT. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX and XIV with FLA. CONST.
art. I, §§1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 12. Surely the expression of an implicit right could not be construed
to diminish the protection affordedl
144. "Since the citizens . . . enacted an amendment to the . . . Constitution expressly
providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it can only be
concluded that that right is broader in scope than that of the Federal Constitution." Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494, 514-15 (Alaska 1975) (Boochever, J., concurring).
145. See id.at 513.
Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
146. See, e.g.,
Sup. CT.REV. 173; Note, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision,
64 CAL. L. Rv.1447 (1976); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty,
48 N.Y.U. L. RE,.. 670 (1978); Note, supra note 103. Valuable discussions of Roe v. Wade include Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973);
Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1973). The symposium on Griswold v. Connecticut in 64 MicH. L. Rav. 197 (1965)
contains several good analyses of that case; especially noteworthy is Emerson, supra note 7.
147. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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timate "precincts of marital bedrooms."'14 The Court noted that the holding
was reached without reliance on the oft-maligned doctrine of substantive due
process.1 49 Subsequent cases,'" however, established that Griswold was not
based on the invasion of the home' 6 ' or the marriage relationship,52 but rather
on the statute's interference with a protected decision1 53 Therefore, in certain
areas, 5 4 the right of privacy substaitively limits the states' power to regulate
conduct.', 5 These protected areas are identified by their importance to the individual156 Only when the Court concludes that freedom from state interference in the individual's decision is "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' ,,a1 does the right exist. Although the Court has recently suggested that

the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is also protected by the
right of privacy,1 58 this interest has yet to be vindicated.'-

Notwithstanding the disavowal in Griswold,

60

9

the federal right of privacy

is an aspect of the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.' 8 ' Therefore, it is part of the doctrine of substantive due process. 8 2 This, however, does
148. Id. at 486.
149. Id. at 482. See notes 162-164 and accompanying text, infra.
150. The more important Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional right of privacy
include: Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(zoning); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (medical records); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (disclosural
privacy); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (sodomy); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning); United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (obscenity); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 118 (1973) (abortion);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (obscenity); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (contraception); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (hair length); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscenity).
151. Nevertheless the home remains a special situs of protected privacy. See Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Stanley v. Georgia, 894 U.S. 557 (1969).
152. Marriage, however, remains a protected relationship. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978).
153. "Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution
protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the
State." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
154. "[T]he Court characterizes] these decisions as dealing with 'matters relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education."'
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
155. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
156. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(emphasis added).
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 802 U.S. 319,
825 (1937)).
158. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977).
159. The Court in Whalen upheld the New York statute after finding no deprivation of
the interest in non-disclosure of personal matters. Id. at 606.
160. 381 U.S. at 482.
161. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 118, 153 (1973). See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 n.23.
162. The fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty against deprivation "without due
process of law," U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, §1, contains both substantive and procedural
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not mean that the right of privacy embraces the discredited branch of substantive due process that was employed to invalidate economic regulations during the Lochner v. New York 6 3 era. Indeed, the Court has expressly repudiated
economic due process16 4 in many right of privacy cases. 165 Accordingly, federal
constitutional protection of privacy only extends to personal rights. 66
If the new provision can only be harmonized with the federal right of
privacy by construing it as related to, but broader than, its federal counterpart, 67 the foregoing analysis mandates that "private life" minimally include
those matters that the government should not, as a matter of principle, be allowed to control. 6 If "private life" were limited to matters not knowingly
exposed to the public, the new provision would protect less than the federal
right.1 9 Conversely, if all non-official conduct were included within "private
life", the zone of protection would be so large that any special relationship to
the federal right would be destroyed."70 In contrast, the interpretation submitted herein establishes protection which relates to the federal right of privacy
yet extends beyond it by including matters which although not "fundamentally

aspects. The substantive aspect of due process prohibits deprivation of liberty even where

procedural safeguards are satisfied. Substantive due process protects liberty "from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints" and where "certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment," it mandates that the state show an important interest which requires the deprivation. Poe v. Ullman,

367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Until the 1930's, the doctrine of substantive due process was often used to strike down
economic regulations. However, economic freedom is no longer regarded as the kind of interest
requiring "particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify" its abridgment.
Those interests which do require strict scrutiny have been termed "fundamental;" they are
interests "for 'the purposes [of securing] which men enter into society.'" Id. at 541. For an

excellent analysis of the doctrine see Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on
(and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 417 (1976).
163. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is the paradigmatic example of the now-discredited application of substantive due process to economic regulation.
164. The term "economic due process" is used to distinguish the Lochner-type application
of substantive due process from the approved application found, for example, in Roe v. Wade.
Although Justice Rehnquist thinks the two applications are "sisters under the skin," see
Rehnquist, supra note 92, at 6, several commentators find the distinction viable. See, e.g.,
Emerson, supra note 7, at 223-25.
165. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1977).
166. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
167. See notes 141-144 and accompanying text, supra.
168. This is not meant to imply anything beyond rejection of the other two suggested
interpretations. The point is that the proposed interpretation is the only one of the three that
is appropriately related to the federal right of privacy.
169. Roe v. Wade, for example, did not distinguish between secret and non-secret abortions. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The rationale of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), prohibits
state interference with private possession of obscene films even where the possession is a
matter of public knowledge.
170. Clearly, under this interpretation the right would protect all economic activity of
private citizens; indeed, it would protect all activity of private citizens. Every law would have
to be proven necessary, not merely rational. The ability of the state to serve the public welfare would be severely curtailed; not liberty but license would result.
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affecting the person 171 nevertheless ought to be beyond governmental control.
This interpretation must now be evaluated and given content.
ANALysIs ANm EVALUATION OF
THE SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION

If private life consists of those aspects of an individual's existence which the
government should not, as a matter of principle, control, the new provision
burdens the courts with the duty of drawing a proper line between the individual and the state.17 2 In other words, the new provision instructs the courts

to determine whether a particular infringement of liberty is justified by the
underlying principles that separate the "spher within which the individual
may assert the supremacy of his own will . . ."173 from the sphere which

the government may legitimately control. Some behavior will remain the
province of the individual either because it is not a matter of legitimate public
concern1 74 or because it is of greater importance to the individual than regulation of it is to the public.'"7 The underlying principles which place conduct

in one sphere or the other change over time. 176 The challenge to those charged
with the responsibility of drawing the line between the individual and the state
is the determination of the contemporary views of Floridians-? 7 concerning the
content of these underlying principles.
Essentially, Florida's constitutional right of privacy reaffirms the courts' role
in protecting individual liberty from unjustified encroachment by government. In this role, courts must examine the justifications articulated for governmental restrictions on the individual's freedom to live his life as he sees
fit.17s The new provision reflects the underlying judgment that restrictions on
individual autonomy are intolerable unless adequately justified by legitimate

171. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). See note 156 and accompanying text,
supra.
172. Thus, this interpretation suggests that the new provision underscores the primary
function of the constitution. See note 6 and accompanying text, supra.
173. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905).
174. The concept of legitimate public concern used here is related but not identical to
that found in tort law. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The
idea here is that certain aspects of one's life are not properly subject to regulation by the
public because there is no legitimate occasion for it to do so.
175. This is the case, for example, in some first amendment freedoms: speech may cause
harm, but freedom from regulation is so important that on balance regulation is prohibited.
176. "[W]here to place the limit- how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control-is a subject

.

. . which ...

[nio tvo ages, and

scarcely any two countries, have decided.., alike; and the decision of one age or country is a
wonder to another." J. MILL, ON LmERTY 8 (1956). See Konvitz, supra note 40, at 274-79.
177. It is, after all, their organic law. More precisely, this follows from the goal of constitutional interpretation. See note 11 and accompanying text, supra. One commentator fails
to appreciate this point, and suggests that the California constitution's right of privacy should
be evaluated by nationwide standards. See Note, City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 69 CAL.
L. REv. 1052 (1981).
178. It has been suggested that standard constitutional analysis is inadequate for this
purpose. Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DuKE L.J. 699 (1976).
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public interests.179 Further, it instructs the courts to determine the specific
liberties immune from governmental interference.180
The appropriateness of the foregoing interpretation can be evaluated by
examining whether it provides the type of resolution demanded by the nature
of the original inquiry. As previously discussed, the dual requirements of
flexibility and consistency in constitutional interpretation 81 mandate that the
resolution must, to some extent, lack permanent specific content and instead
provide general standards which can be given specific content amenable to
contemporary views.182 The interpretation suggested herein fulfills both criteria. It sets forth content-neutral principles8 3 which when given contemporary
content provide workable rules which the courts can apply to different factual
contexts.

18 4

THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF LEGITIMATE

PUBLIC CONCERN TODAY

Although the foregoing analysis provides a structural framework for interpreting the meaning of Florida's constitutional right of privacy, it does not
furnish the contemporary meaning of the provision. Knowledge of the current
views of Floridians on the underlying principles separating the sphere of individual autonomy from the sphere of governmental control is required to give
content-specific meaning to the new provision. 8 5
The relevant views of Floridians cannot be extrapolated from public
opinion polls or from legislative acts because these sources have not focused on
fundamental underlying principles.1s6 Court opinions are useful in discerning
these views since they expressly address the true issue.18 7 Nevertheless, standing
alone they are limited because they indicate only past views.188 The adoption
of the new provision necessarily reflects public dissatisfaction with the existing
scope of governmental control.18 1 Therefore, limitations on individual liberty
that were once seen as legitimate are likely intolerable today.
It is beyond the scope of this note to attempt to categorize those matters
which are so important to the individual that they fall outside the sphere of
179.
180.
181.
182,
183.

See H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 20-21 (1963).
See note 4 supra.
See notes 13-14 and accompanying text, supra.
See notes 15-18 and accompanying text, supra.
Namely, that the new provision protects what should not be, as a matter of principle,

subject to governmental control.
184. See generally Wechsler, supra note 14.
185. See note 177 and accompanying text, supra.
186. Rather, they identify only particular details which may not conform with the underlying principles.
187. This occurs in the course of fulfilling their imperative and unceasing duty "to maintain the constitution as the fundamental law of the state." Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d
148, 150 (Fla. 1953). See notes 4-9 and accompanying text, supra.

188.

These views can vary significantly over time. See note 176 and accompanying text,

supra.

189. Since the right of privacy establishes a new line between the individual and the state,
see note 5 supra, its adoption must reflect dissatisfaction with the previously existing one.
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justifiable governmental control. 19 0 However, the remainder of this section
briefly addresses the contemporary understanding of the matters constituting
legitimate public concern.
The standard formulation of the sphere of legitimate governmental regulation, expressed as the scope of the state's police power, is protection of the
public health, safety, morals and welfare.1 91 Laws which fail to serve these interests are beyond the state's legitimate power and are void. 192 Since an exercise
of the police power must serve the public welfare,193 prevention of harm to
others is arguably a condition to constraining an individual's liberty.190 This
requirement is classically expressed in John Stuart Mill's famous essay On
Liberty:195
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted... in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number .... the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,... is to prevent harm to others. His own good... is
not a sufficient warrant.
Nevertheless, the Florida supreme court in State v. Eitel 96 sustained the constitutionality of a statute 97 requiring that motorcyclists wear helmets and held
that "society has an interest in the preservation of the life of the individual for
his own sake."' 9 8 The opinion is remarkable not only for its unprecedented
holding 99 but also for its candor and sensitivity. The court noted its approval
of Mill's essay, and quoted a passage to bolster its holding, indicating that the
public was harmed by the increased medical expenses arising from accidents
200
where motorcyclists did not wear helmets.
20
Legislative revision ' of the statute involved in Eitel could obviate challenges to it based on the new privacy provision. If not revised, the public harm
noted in the decision might still save the statute from successful attack. 202 The
190. See generally Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497,
522 (1961); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 210-14 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
191. Hamilton v. State, 366 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1978); Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 191
(Fla. 1958); Perry Trading Co. v. Tallahassee, 128 Fla. 424, 433-35, 443-44, 174 So. 854, 858, 862
(1937); Sweat v. Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc., 112 Fla. 428, 430, 150 So. 617, 618 (1933);
Cawthen v. Town of De Funiak Springs, 88 Fla. 324, 326, 102 So. 250, 251 (1924).
192. Carroll v. State, 361 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1978); Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nay.
Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376, 879 (Fla. 1965); Delmonico v. State, 155 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla.
1963); Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209, 211-14 (Fla. 1968); Corneal v. State Plant
Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957); Valdez v. State ex rel. Farrior, 142 Fla. 123, 129, 194 So. 388,

391 (1940).
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
Harm is given broad meaning here and includes any detriment to the public welfare.
J. MmLu, supranote 176, at 13.
227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969).
FLA. STAT. §317.981 (1967).
227 So. 2d at 491.
"The search for precedent is often frustrated." Id.

200. See id.
201. See note 98 supra.
202. The statute may be justified because it prevents harm to those who are not constrained by it.
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precise holding in Eitel, that the state's legitimate interest in preserving the
individual's life for his own sake justifies the imposition of a minimal inconvenience, 2° 3 however, may well be invalidated by the privacy amendment. Both
judges 2°4 and commentators 20 5 have noted the connection between the right to
be let alone and Mill's philosophy. The fundamental requirement of Mill's
philosophy, that only harm to others justifies restrictions on liberty, has been
expressly adopted by the Supreme Court of Alaska 2 06 and implicitly approved
by the Supreme Court of the United States 207 in connection with the right to be
let alone. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that recognition of the right to
be let alone in the Florida Constitution signifies at least that "where an individual's conduct ... does not directly harm others the public interest is not
affected and [the conduct] is not properly the subject of the police power of the
legislature."

208

CONCLUSION

This note has examined Florida's new constitutional right of privacy according to a structural framework established by basic principles of constitutional construction. The examination revealed that the new provision underscores the primary function of the constitution: defining the limits of the state's
power over the individual citizen. By highlighting this constitutional purpose
the right of privacy demands close judicial attention to the justifications for
state-imposed restrictions on liberty. This heightened attention to the underlying principles of our scheme of government can serve every Floridian well by
narrowing the gap between our conduct and our ideals. The courts must perfect
the new provision's potential by seriously scrutinizing the proper sphere of
governmental regulation. Such scrutiny should establish the individual's right
to live life as he sees fit to the extent his conduct does not harm others.
JOSEPH S. JACKSON
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

227 So. 2d at 491.
See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
See, e.g., Cope, supra note 39, at 722 n.303.
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 11, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
State v. Lee, 465 P.2d 573, 577 (Hawaii 1970).
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